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Regulatory posture

This page tells an operator, or anyone who distributes SithBit, where the software stands against the EU instruments that reach a decentralized mail service. It covers what the software already gives you, what you have to build yourself, and which positions come from the architecture and cannot be fixed in code. Read it before you run SithBit for real users in the EU, so you start from this analysis instead of working it out again.

This is an engineering assessment, not legal advice. It maps the code and the docs to the instruments’ requirements. Before you rely on it, confirm article numbers, annex classification and dates against the text published in the Official Journal, and have qualified EU counsel review your own deployment.

SithBit is alpha software with no production deployment. The Cyber Resilience Act attaches when a product is placed on the market, and GDPR attaches when real personal data is processed. No duty below applies until one of those happens, so now is the cheapest time to close the gaps.

Which instrument binds whom

Each instrument puts its duties on a different party. One person can hold more than one role. If you build a release and also run it, you are both the manufacturer and the operator.

InstrumentBindsWhat it reaches in SithBit
Cyber Resilience Act (CRA, Reg. (EU) 2024/2847)The manufacturer: whoever places the binaries, CLI, browser extensions or web clients on the EU marketProduct security (Annex I Part I) and vulnerability handling (Annex I Part II). The duty to report actively exploited vulnerabilities applies from 11 September 2026, and the full obligations from 11 December 2027.
NIS2 (Dir. (EU) 2022/2555)The operator of a sithbitd service above the national size thresholdsRisk management, logging, incident notification and supply-chain assurance for the service you run. NIS2 binds the operator, not the software.
GDPR (Reg. (EU) 2016/679), with ePrivacyThe controller of a deployment that processes real personal dataLawful basis, data minimisation, storage limitation, erasure, portability and transfers. This is where the architecture creates real tension (see the positions that cannot be engineered away).
Digital Services Act (DSA, Reg. (EU) 2022/2065)The provider of an intermediary serviceLow exposure. See the DSA section.

Every instrument ties its duties to an identified party. The repository’s root LICENSE file carries the MIT license and a copyright notice, and every crate declares license = "MIT", either directly or through license.workspace. A distributor still has to name itself as manufacturer, controller or provider for its own release or deployment. The license does not do that for you.

What the software gives an operator

An operator’s obligations sit on top of a stack that already handles much of the protocol layer:

  • Transport security. The shared TLS configuration in server_common builds through with_safe_default_protocol_versions, which accepts only TLS 1.3 and 1.2. A test there pins that set, so a downgrade turns the gate red. IMAP and POP default require_tls to true, which refuses login commands until TLS is active. mail_grpc refuses to start on a non-loopback bind unless mutual TLS is configured.
  • Abuse resistance. Connection limits, cross-connection auth-failure limits, DNSBL lookups, outbound quotas, and SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement. See Standards and RFC coverage and outbound quotas and suspension.
  • A published risk analysis. The threat model can seed an operator’s own NIS2 risk-management measures and a manufacturer’s CRA risk assessment.
  • An admin and auth audit trail. The account API’s admin mutations, its admin export, and its token and logout routes each emit one structured audit event per call, recording actor, action and outcome, plus the subject wallet on admin routes. See audit logging on admin and auth routes.
  • Erasure and portability of off-chain data. The admin erase sweeps a wallet’s off-chain records, and GET /v1/account/export streams a machine-readable portability export. See erasing your off-chain data and portability export and streaming.
  • Retention defaults. [spooler] report_retention_days and dmarc_retention_days prune data that carries sender IP addresses after 90 days by default. See the spooler settings.
  • Minimisation on submission. By default the submission listener’s Received: header leaves out the authenticated user’s IP literal (received_ip), because that header is sealed into the body and pinned to IPFS. See the two SMTP listeners.
  • Client-side sealing and no trackers. Lockbox seals mail on the sender’s device before it is sent, so the operator never holds a plaintext copy. For the ePrivacy position on the paid inbox, see tracking pixels, consent, and the paid inbox.

What an operator has to build

The following are outside the software and are the operator’s job:

  • Log aggregation, retention and tamper evidence. Services log structured lines to stdout, and OTLP export is off until you configure it (see logs and telemetry export). Collecting, retaining and protecting those logs, audit events included, is up to you.
  • Incident detection and notification. NIS2 and the CRA reporting duty both expect an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of an incident or exploited vulnerability. SithBit ships no notification runbook.
  • Business continuity. Backups are covered in monitoring and backups. Crisis management and continuity planning are not.
  • Legal documents. A privacy policy, terms of service, a record of lawful basis, and a data-subject request process. The privacy chapter and its field reference are technical disclosures to build these from. They are not those documents.
  • Self-service erase. Users can export their own data, but only the operator can erase it, through the admin route or the console. A data-subject erasure request has to reach the operator.

What a distributor has to build

If you publish SithBit builds as a manufacturer, the CRA’s vulnerability-handling requirements fall on you. The repository does not yet supply these. Check its current state before you rely on that:

  • a SECURITY.md naming a security contact and a coordinated-disclosure policy;
  • dependency-advisory scanning in the gate;
  • a machine-readable SBOM for each release;
  • signed images with build provenance, and digest pinning in place of the latest image tags that the iac/ variables default to;
  • release tags that link a protocol version in the change history to a published image, so a security fix leads to a version you can pull.

Positions that cannot be engineered away

These follow from building on a public ledger and a content-addressed network. They need a documented legal position, not a ticket:

  • On-chain history cannot be erased. DeleteMail reaps the message account, but the transaction that created it stays on the ledger: sender wallet, recipient wallet, from_hash, CID and timestamp. See on-chain: public and permanent.
  • from_hash is pseudonymous, not anonymous. It hides the address string, but anyone with a list of candidate addresses can confirm a guess. GDPR still treats it as personal data, and erasure rights attach to data that by construction cannot be erased. See message metadata is hashed, not hidden.
  • Published IPFS content cannot be withdrawn. Unpinning releases one keeper’s copy, and anyone else may still hold theirs. The no_ipfs opt-out only applies to future mail. See IPFS storage: benefits to users.
  • The server-side plaintext window outside Lockbox. Without Lockbox, the operator seals the body, so it sees the plaintext while doing so. The privacy chapter and the threat model both document this.
  • No pinnable data residency for the chain or the DHT. Solana and the IPFS DHT are replicated worldwide by design. You can choose a region for the infrastructure you run, but not for the chain or the DHT. For transfers under GDPR Chapter V, this question has no technical answer.

Digital Services Act

Exposure is low and depends on how you deploy. The IPFS gateway is read-only and serves only local content, so it is not a hosting service for uploads from third parties. The pin daemon stores recipients’ mail as part of a communications service, not to make it public. The name marketplace trades protocol authority, not content, but it does publish holders, prices and winning bids on-chain. Raise this in a legal review. It is not engineering work.

See also