Authorize a domain by proof

Every SithBit domain is really a DNS domain — the same name that shows up in a browser’s address bar, governed by the same domain-name system the rest of the internet already answers to. Normally, claiming that identity on chain means asking the postoffice’s delegate to authorize it by hand: a human administrator has to trust that you actually control the domain and sign a transaction saying so. See Who can create a domain for that delegate-signed path.

There’s a second option: prove it yourself, and skip the administrator entirely. If you already control a domain’s DNS records, you can generate a cryptographic proof that shows exactly that — and the chain checks the proof itself, on the spot, rather than trusting a human’s say-so. No delegate signature is needed, and the proof doesn’t even have to be submitted by you personally: whoever ends up holding it can send the transaction (and pay for it), because the proof itself carries the authority, not whoever happens to click submit.

This works because SithBit treats DNS as the ultimate root of trust for who owns a name. On-chain possession of a domain is never final or self-sufficient on its own — it always answers to whoever genuinely controls the domain in the real DNS system. That cuts both ways: if a domain’s on-chain record ever falls out of sync with reality — after a change of hands at the registrar, say, or a stale claim left over from before — the domain’s rightful DNS owner can prove control again and reclaim the on-chain authority outright. The chain defers to DNS, not the other way around.

For the cryptography under the hood — how the proof is built, staged, and verified on chain, and the exact commands to run — see Authorize a domain by proof.